

SECURITY BEYOND SURVIVAL

ESSAYS FOR K. SUBRAHMANYAM

EDITOR

P.R. KUMARASWAMY



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ECLIPSED MOON TO A RISING SUN

ASHOK KAPUR*

INTRODUCTION

In modern history, the causes of war and conflict, their management, military strategies as well as diplomatic practices of the major and minor powers, and their power relationships, are the central questions. According to K.J. Holsti, war is also the central concern of international theory because it has been a major source of historical change, a profound determinant of *all* political life.¹ To quote Hedley Bull,

It is war and the threat of war that help to determine whether particular states survive or are eliminated, whether they rise or decline, whether their frontiers remain the same or are changed, whether the people are ruled by one government or another ... War and threat of war ... are so basic that even the terms used to describe the system—great powers and small powers, alliances and spheres of influence, balances of power and hegemony—are scarcely intelligible except in relation to war and the threat of war.²

War and conflict were also the centrepiece of traditional Indian political and social thought as represented by Kautilya's *Arthashastra*.


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The guiding principle was that of 'success' not right or wrong in moral terms. Heinrich Zimmer and J. Campbell make the point as follows:

... what is going on today in a large portion of the world would seem, in the light of this book [*Arthasastra*], to amount to a total Asiatization of political affairs, both international and domestic. And the laws are seen again to be what they were in ages past. One feels inclined to bestow a new and deep respect on the genius who at that early period recognized and elucidated the basic forces and situations that were to remain perennial in the human political field. The same style of Indian thought that invented the game of chess grasped with profound insight the rules of this larger game of power. And these are rules that cannot be disregarded by anyone seriously preparing to enter the field of political action.³

It is undoubtedly true that war and conflict were not always in international history the central questions. Thus Robert Marks makes the case that prior to the growth of Western colonisation and imperialism, and the European creation and use of the steamship and military power, international relationships were based primarily on the development of international trade among the Chinese, Indian (Mughal), and Muslim (Ottoman and Arab) empires. Says Marks,

... with the exception of the Americas, southernmost Africa, and most of Oceania, the world's societies in the fifteenth century had extensive and systematic interactions and linkages forged by trade. This early modern system was made possible by three factors. Some parts of the world, in particular China and India, had a *technological advantage* over the rest, and hence were able to produce industrial goods cheaper and better than anyone anywhere else, in particular silk and porcelain in China and cotton textiles in India. Second, *climatic and geographic constraints* limited some natural products to one or a few places on earth And third, *consumer tastes and social conventions* shaped demand for luxury items ... [and] increasingly mass-market items like cotton textiles, and precious metals as the foundation for a monetary system The trade linkages among the various parts of the world emerged as an outcome of the complex interplay of these factors⁴ (see map).



Source: Adapted from Robert B. Marks, *The Origins of the Modern World* (Boston, 2002), p. 34.

In the pre-Western colonial era, the centre of the gravity of international relationships was the present day's Central Asia, the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, East and Southeast Asia, and the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. What followed was the dominance of Asia and the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean worlds by the skilled use of military strength, political organisation, and new trade measures to change the pre-colonial pattern of power relationships and the economic dominance of the non-Western powers. The works of Robert Marks and K.M. Panikkar tell this part of the story.⁵

The argument of this chapter is that Indian political and social thought and Indian policies can be comfortably and conveniently studied around the attitudes and policies of two Indian leaders: Jawaharlal Nehru and Atal Behari Vajpayee. Although there were other Indian prime ministers and leaders in play between the two extremities (such as Indira Gandhi who was instrumental in the creation of Bangladesh and P.V. Narasimha Rao who initiated economic reforms in India), Nehru and Vajpayee are symbols of two powerful and competitive diplomatic and strategic traditions in the Indian body politic. The two traditions precede both Nehru and Vajpayee. The first, the realist tradition, is embedded in the Kautilyan statement. The second, the utopian tradition, is embedded in the history of peaceful synthesis in Indian history, which was ably discussed by former Indian ambassador Arthur Lall.⁶

In my story, Nehru is the eclipsed moon. 'Moon' because he reflected the light from the sun, his ideas and his policies were borrowed from outside: from the British Fabians and Theosophists, as far as his intellectual roots and his economic policies were concerned; from Lord Louis Mountbatten as far as his policies on Kashmir and Pakistan were concerned; and from K.M. Panikkar, S. Radhakrishnan, and Krishna Menon, as far as his policies on the Korean war, China and the US were concerned. Nehru was obviously loved by the Indian people, they trusted him, but whom he eventually betrayed through a series of failed policies: the war with China, the conflicts with Pakistan, Indian socialism, which produced the Raj of the IAS bureaucracy and corruption at all levels of the central, state, and local governments, and an inability to manage the ravages of a growing population and endemic poverty. While there were some successes, such as building the foundation of electoral democracy, the overall record was one of failure in diplomatic and military affairs. Nehru started out as the leader of free India as the rising sun in 1947, but by 1962 he was a

defeated man; defeated not only in the Himalayan border conflict with China but defeated by his inability to think through the requirements of making India an important part of global power equations.

Nehru's legacy is one of double defeat: he marginalised himself in the Indian sphere and he marginalised India in the international sphere. This judgement is validated in two ways. The first is an objective measure where one could assess India's ranking in the world of powers (major and minor ones) using the standard definition of powers as set out in Table 3.1. The second one is a subjective measure and it relies on external recognition of India's international and regional influence. Alastair Buchan got it right when he pointed out that:

... though India is Asia's second largest state, she possesses little external influence there (except with her immediate neighbours); she is a static power in diplomatic terms at present, and the evolution of local relationships elsewhere in Asia is unlikely to be greatly affected by her conceptions or initiatives, even though her relations with China may become less hostile and those with the United States less sour.⁷ ... With the change in the American attitude to China, India is no longer seen as great alternative society whose success and therefore whose magnetism for other Asian societies must be encouraged.⁸

Escott Reid, Canadian High Commissioner to India during 1952-57, initially an admirer of Nehru, makes the following observations,

... in the first seven or eight years of independence, Indian diplomacy had suffered from the traditional defects of generous youth or gifted amateurs—reading lectures and self-righteous sermons to the world; offering simple solutions to difficult problems; dissipating one's influence over too wide a field instead of conserving one's influence for matters directly affecting the national interest; trying to do good in matters not of direct concern to one's country, but of very direct concern to other countries.⁹

... with every year that passes more and more Indians of the governing classes become more and more concerned with the possibility that their great northern neighbour, China, will soon outstrip them in the race for economic and social betterment.

Table 3.1
Grading of Powers

Criteria	Type of power				
	Great power	Regional power	Middle power	Small power	Failing power
Ambition to be world leader	Yes	Maybe	No	No	No
Scope of general interests is extensive (globally and/or in a region)	Yes	Variable	Variable	No	No
Capacity to act alone	Yes	Yes, regionally	No	No	No
Possesses strength over neighbours	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
International role(s) differ (leader or follower)	Global power	Leader within region	Follows division of labour with global leader	No	No
Possesses technological edge in military and economic areas	Yes	Yes, in the region	Yes, in some areas	No	No
Has the ability to create and to maintain international and/or regional institutions	Yes	Yes, within the region	No, but participates actively in such institutions	No	No
There is external recognition of its superior/important position	Yes	Yes, in the regional context	Yes, as a middle power	Yes, as a local power	No

Note: Excluded from this list are 'failed states' and 'nobodies' (that is, those states which lack motivation and capacity to shape or alter the pattern of global or regional relationships for example, Somalia).

And the implications of that for India, for the other countries of Asia and for the world are enormous.¹⁰

This was obviously not a judgement Nehru would have wished for himself and for India. Nehru intended for India to be taken seriously by the world powers and by the Indian people but this was not to be because Nehru and his admirers did not realise that he was effective when he enjoyed the favour of the Western world and Soviet Russia and when international circumstances (Cold War and extreme bipolarity) favoured India's Third World and 'third-party as mediator' position. Favourable external circumstances, not India's internal economic and military strength, led to Nehru's emergence as a rising sun, however, temporarily. But in the 1950s, international circumstances changed. Once the super powers found it beneficial to conduct a bilateral détente dialogue with each other, and once China decided to challenge India's military capacity, its China policy, and its international authority, and it did so by also building special links with India's arch enemy, Pakistan, Nehru's game was essentially over. The initiative had passed from Nehru's hand. His circle of admirers shrunk to his unelected inner circle of Indian leftists and followers who had benefited from the patronage of Nehru and that of the Indian state. Nehru died as the eclipsed moon, but he left behind a small tribe of widows and orphans (to use M.J. Akbar's words) who have tried to maintain the Nehruvian legacy through the Congress Party and the various Nehru family research foundations and trusts.

In our narrative, the BJP-led coalition headed by Vajpayee represents the rising sun. The contrast between the attitude and policies of Nehru and Vajpayee are studied here. The time frame of comparison differs: Nehru was in power for 17 years (1947-64); Vajpayee has been in power for five years. Nehru had no peer and no challenger to his power and authority within India after the death of the Congress Party stalwarts like Vallabhai Patel, G.B. Pant, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, and Rajendra Prasad. Vajpayee's inner circle is faction ridden and the 'moderate' group within the BJP has an ongoing battle with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) ideologues and hardliners about economic and foreign policies. There are also many prime ministers-in-waiting within the Indian cabinet. While the Nehru centre was politically strong because of Nehru's pre-eminent position in Indian politics and his success at the polls, the Vajpayee political centre is

weak and held together by his personality and political skills in managing a difficult coalition.

The international experiences of the two are also sharply varied. Nehru was educated in the United Kingdom (UK), he mingled with the rich and the famous, was cosmopolitan in his outlook, and had some sense of history albeit not necessarily a sound one. He did not understand the lessons of Indian military and political history or the lessons of the problem of war and the importance of using the standard methods of international power politics. Vajpayee's forte is poetry and sound political instincts, rather than world history or political ideas. Nehru was articulate; Vajpayee is uncomfortable with the English language and does not have the same stage presence as Nehru. But despite the huge differences in personalities, international experiences, and political circumstances, Nehru's India and Nehru himself started at the top and came down; Vajpayee's India started at the bottom and moved up. Vajpayee is not a theoretician but he has been able in a short span of time to bring India back from out of the cold into the mainstream of world politics, whereas Nehru took India from the global mainstream in the early 1950s into the international political wilderness; Nehru marginalised India, whereas Vajpayee has created 'added value' to India's diplomatic, economic, and military portfolios. Nehru was a bridge player who played a good hand badly. Vajpayee is a bridge player who has played a poor hand well.

The following section will argue that Vajpayee has managed to enable India to engage the major and minor powers of the world today because he understands that the real problematique concerns are the issue of war and conflict in India's dangerous neighbourhood. Nehru's problematique, on the other hand, was to devise a world order which made the world safe. In the long run, however, the pursuit of this world order made India unsafe. Nehru had a globalist and a utopian view whereas Vajpayee's government has an Indian view of Indian security in its broadest sense. In this sense, Vajpayee is more Indian than Nehru was. In this sense, India is a rising power. The metaphor of Vajpayee's India as the rising sun is appropriate because Nehru relied on borrowed power from the West while Vajpayee has thus far (that is, mid-2003) created internal strength and strategies and projected it outside India's borders. The difference is fundamental. Whereas Nehru was trying to create a peaceful global society, and in the process had effectively boxed India into the globalist tradition (a minority one in international history and in international theory—

see Holsti), Vajpayee has sought to develop linkages with likeminded major and secondary powers, which are voluntary, are based on common perspectives and interests, and require the development of new bargains with non-traditional allies.

Vajpayee has also sought to develop 'involuntary' links with Pakistan and China and to engage the two by diplomatic and military means. The links are called 'involuntary' because these two nations are located in India's immediate neighbourhood—one is an enemy and the other is a competitor—and links with them are a matter of necessity. The emphasis, for the Vajpayee government, is not on building peaceful relations with Pakistan and China (a favourite Nehruvian line), but on developing the best possible relations under the given circumstances and doing so by engaging the foreign threats and by creating a public identification within India about these problem countries and their subversive policies. Vajpayee is a realist and a practitioner, who understands the importance of the criteria of success and thus is in tune with the ancient principles of Indian statecraft (as discussed in Kautilya's *Arthashastra*) and with the actual pattern of Indian military and political history, right from the ancient times to the Mughal period down to the period of British colonial rule. In a historical perspective, it is fair to say that Nehru's diplomatic record and his political philosophy with regard to international relations and Indian foreign and military affairs should be judged as a sideshow and a costly one at that for Indians. I now turn to a discussion of the different worlds of Nehru and the Vajpayee.

NEHRU'S WORLD, 1947-64:

HOW THE MOON WAS ECLIPSED

This section is about Nehru the practitioner. It is an assessment of the record of his achievements and failures in a number of areas: (i) India's diplomatic history; (ii) India's administrative history; (iii) India's nationalist rhetoric; and (iv) India's nation-building as measured by India's economic performance and democracy.

Sunil Khilnani projects Nehru as the father of Indian democracy, who challenged the Asian authoritarian tradition. Thus Khilnani sees a clash between civilisation and modernity, which Nehru tried to

synthesise and in seeking to modernise India, Nehru sought to bring it into the mainstream of world history.¹¹ However, there is a deeper reality behind Nehru's modernity and his secularism. Indian democracy was a Nehru-dominated democracy and its foreign policy represented a Nehru-centric alliance between a mix of ideological, bureaucratic, and international forces. The alliance consisted of Nehru and his Kashmiri family and advisers, Indian leftists like Krishna Menon, S. Radhakrishnan, and K.M. Panikkar, members of the IAS who served Nehru in the name of serving India, and the Indian people who loved and trusted Nehru and repeatedly voted him into power. The idea of democracy and modernity completed the alliance structure.

This view of the operative alliance is based on a judgement about who actually occupied and managed the political space of Indian politics and its external diplomatic and military policies, rhetoric aside. The theme is that the alliance occupied the key decision points in the decision-making space. The strategy was to hijack the state apparatus and Nehru and the Congress Party did that in the electoral sphere, and the unelected inner circle of Nehru advisers (Menon, Radhakrishnan, Panikkar, and Mountbatten) found in Nehru a useful pupil. They joined Nehru in hijacking the state machinery to promote their and Nehru's agenda in foreign and military affairs. Thus, Mountbatten shaped the framework of Nehru's thinking on Kashmir and Pakistan. Ceasefire with Pakistan during the first Kashmir campaign, reference of the issue to the UN, and the quest for friendship with Pakistan were points advocated by Mountbatten and opposed by Patel. Menon, Radhakrishnan, and Panikkar shaped Nehru's policy on Korea (1950–53), USSR, and China and because of the salience of these issues with the US, they affected India's relations with the US as well. They shaped Nehru's focus on global disarmament (particularly Menon), and the search for peaceful relations with China (particularly Panikkar and Menon).

A related strategy was to compartmentalise the decision-making process and let Nehru's followers and appointees articulate and manage the policy boundaries of the decision-making process without a thorough public debate about the pros and cons of each policy issue. This alliance and approach worked well under the umbrella of India's fantastic electoral democracy, which legitimised the central government's policies. It worked well in the diplomatic and the international sphere as long as international circumstances favoured Indian

diplomacy. Nehru and the civil bureaucracy's antipathy of the Indian armed forces and the importance of military power worked well as long as India did not face a major challenge to its national security and as long as Nehru's pacifist assumptions and inclinations remained untested. The twin strategies—(i) hijacking of the state apparatus by Nehru and his unelected advisers and civil servants, and (ii) the compartmentalisation of the decision-making process and secrecy, showed that independent India's administrative history was founded on the rules and principles of colonial administration except that the civil servants were now answerable to their political masters who were dependent on their bureaucrats for advice and lacked the professional skills to plans India's economic, diplomatic, and military futures.

So while the Nehru era had an idea about the value of democracy and about modernity and secularism, the idea was processed by a state machinery, which was after independence, post-imperial, but in actual fact was still secretive, manipulative, bound by the administrative procedures of the British Raj, and to the extent that public debate about public policy issues was missing in Indian political life, it was not openly democratic. This was true of Indian economic, diplomatic, and military policies during the Nehru era. Khilnani cites Gunnar Myrdal on the failure of Indian economic planning, Nehru's brainchild. There was no democracy in the Indian Planning Commission. Nehru had packed it with his appointees, and key policy choices were not debated (except perhaps during the preparation of the Second Five-Year Plan).¹² The Nehru era did not bring India into the global economic mainstream.

Did Nehru succeed in creating an Indian nation? To answer this, one must first understand the meaning of 'India'. It was the Mughals followed by the British who developed the idea of India as a geographical entity and gave it strategic and administrative unity by bringing together conventions of revenue administration, tax collection, and law and order based on central and local political authority. In this way, village communities and kingdoms were brought together through a process of conquest, alliance activity, and direct or indirect rule. It is an arguable point whether the British left India in 1947 because of the pressure of Indian nationalism or whether they left because they were exhausted and over-extended in their imperialist enterprises, that is, they left because the empire had been built, local economies had been plundered, traditional societies had been disrupted and fractured like broken glass, divide-and-rule norms had become entrenched

among local rivals, and *the transfer of power became a transfer of problems*. Geoffrey Fairbairn's analysis indicates the sense of British over-extension by the late 1800s.¹³ Britain defeated the Boers in South Africa but recognised that its military lines were over-extended. In the Far East, Britain could not maintain its diplomatic and naval primacy against the Americans and hence sought an alliance with Japan in the early 1900s. So it may be coincidence that the British left India and the Congress Party filled the political vacuum by default.

Anyway, Nehru and the Congress Party captured the British Indian political space where political power was 'undistributed' (to use Owen Lattimore's term) after 1947. An important point is that the Congress Party took the 'Indian' political space but Nehru, his advisers, and civil servants dominated the decision-making space. This was in part because Nehru had the authority to lead, and in part because the checks and balances on Nehru in the Indian cabinet were lost once Patel, Pant, and Azad (to take a few examples) died or peacefully surrendered authority to Nehru (as Patel did on the issues of Tibet, Kashmir, and China). It goes to Nehru's credit that he occupied the political space and distributed or re-distributed the decision-making power among his supporters or those who could shape the Nehru agenda. Nehru's state building was based on the development of the statist infrastructure left by the British rulers (the railways, canals, roads, the multitude of institutes, and, of course, the Government of India and its departments and rules). Nehru's singular departure from the British practice was to reject the theory and practice of using military strength to project power in its neighbourhood and to replace the classical tradition of power politics and geo-politics with the theory of non-alignment and peace diplomacy.

Nehru's admirers credit him with the theory and practice of Indian non-alignment. Thus, Khilnani is euphoric about Nehru's brand of diplomacy.

For Nehru, the authority of the new state rested not solely on domestic procedures of constitutional democracy but also on establishing its sovereignty in the international arena In his determination to secure India's sovereignty, he developed the idea of non-alignment. The principles he enunciated at the Bandung Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in 1955¹⁴ seem faded and distant ideal now, but in the mid-1950s they were a

radical departure from the obstinate polarities of the Cold War. There were a few stumbles in this doctrine of active neutrality—most notably India's momentary hesitation about condemning the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956—but in the main Nehru achieved outstanding successes, establishing India as a forceful and independent voice in international politics. This was a staggering performance for a poor country that had only recently emerged from colonial rule. At the core of Nehru's idea of non-alignment was his conviction that Asia was finally taking charge of its own history as it emerged from the shadow of European domination.¹⁵

My view is that Nehru initially had an effective diplomatic strategy to join the international mainstream, given India's economic and military weaknesses and the priority of nation-building and developing Indian political institutions and economic policies. Nehru did rather well in the 1947 to mid-1950s period under the circumstances. Nehru's India had to choose between five options:

- (a) do nothing, be passive, and opt out of the international power game;
- (b) increase India's internal strength in the economic and military spheres and thereby increase India's weight in the distribution of power in the world;
- (c) build bridges between the Cold War rivals recognising bipolarity as the central paradigm in world politics, seek to reduce tensions between the Big Two and gain prominence for third-party initiatives;
- (d) play all sides against each other to India's advantage and think of world politics as a triangular exercise involving the US, USSR, and the People's Republic of China. Here India was intended to emerge as the fourth side of the global power equation but power was measured in moral and economic terms rather than military terms. The idea was to increase India's space and respect in the international system; and
- (e) to increase international tensions by third-party action and to attract attention for one's interests as China did in various international crises including the Korean War and later in the Indo-China conflict.

Nehru publicly used the third and fourth options emphasising peace, disarmament, the UN, and conflict reduction methods to lower the temperature of international crises such as Korea, Suez, Indo-China and did so in the context of bipolarity. But then the Chanakya in Nehru also used the Moscow connection to attract American attention, the Washington connection to attract the attention of Moscow and, finally, the Beijing connection to attract Moscow and Washington. Nehru was successful during this period because Moscow saw Nehru's India as the gateway for the promotion of Soviet influence in the Third World. Moscow never tired of singing the praise of Indian non-alignment and peace diplomacy even though USSR itself relied on nuclear deterrence and the war option with America as a last resort. America, on the other hand, saw democratic India as the alternative to China in Asia's political development.

The Chanakya in Nehru was successful in another area. Much as he decried atomic warfare, he authorised scientific research to create the technical basis of the Indian nuclear bomb. This was done secretly. Nehru maintained firm control over the decision not to go nuclear and thus he exercised control over the policy boundary of the strategic issue. He played a critical role in ensuring that India stayed abreast of modern atomic science and technology. This policy was a gift to the Indian nation, which Vajpayee was to exploit later. (One cannot attach much importance to Pokhran-I (1974) sanctioned by Indira Gandhi because Mrs Gandhi was quick to reverse it and to deny military intent to the programme.)

Khilnani's euphoria about Nehru's success in establishing India's sovereignty and independence and forcefulness in international relations is misplaced because China called Nehru's bluff and fought the 1962 war on a secondary issue in Sino-Indian relations, that is, the boundary dispute, and showed that Nehru had feet of clay. But 1962 was the final straw which broke Nehru's back. Before 1962, Nehru's economic policies produced a mixed record. There were made-in-India economic failures and his policies created barriers, which were self-imposed and based on a socialist ideology rather than on the interests of the ruled, which prevented India from becoming a part of the world's economic history. In the mid-1950s, China established the basis of a strategic link between Islamic Pakistan and atheistic China based on a common cause against India. At the time when Chinese and Indian leaders were projecting peaceful coexistence,

the Chinese took the initiative, or responded to Pakistani initiative, to develop a continuous line of pressure against India through Pakistan.

On major regional and international issues, Nehru sacrificed Indian sovereignty in two ways: in the sense that the term means a capacity to act independently, and in the second sense that leaders over time are expected to increase their capability and willingness to function independently, that is, they are expected to increase their space or autonomy in regional and international affairs. Nehru's Pakistan policy (no war with Pakistan and friendship with it) reduced India's ability to manoeuvre. By ordering a ceasefire in Kashmir, Nehru undermined the Indian military option in the area and further demoralised the Indian military. By taking the issue to the UN Security Council, Nehru joined the global mainstream of power politics and made India the prisoner of Big Power politics in the international arena. By neglecting Indian defences, he failed to join the international mainstream that recognised the central place of power politics and geopolitics in a country's external affairs.

Thus he learnt nothing from the Chinese experience, which was to rely less on cultural diplomacy (a stand taken following the Opium War and the Treaty of Nanking [1842], which humiliated China) and to rely more on the relationship between war and international politics and war and domestic revolution.¹⁶ However, Khilnani is right to an extent. Nehru's success lay in establishing the Indian state as the core of Indian society and to making the Indian democracy a process of legitimate elections and political dialogue in the context of inequities.¹⁷

Nehru's failures in the diplomatic and military spheres are measured by the shift in the choice of options by Nehru's successors. Indira Gandhi chose the second (increase India's strength) and the fifth option (increase international tensions) when she attacked East Pakistan and dismembered Pakistan and did so by using military force in a proactive and successful manner (which was a most un-Nehruvian stance) and by raising international tensions that brought the three major powers into the crisis. Earlier Lal Bahadur Shastri (1964-66) broke the Nehruvian taboo against attacking Pakistan when he ordered the Indian army to cross the international border with Pakistan in response to Bhutto's military adventure in Jammu and Kashmir. Rajiv Gandhi kept up the process of modernisation of the Indian military and research in the field of nuclear science. Narasimha Rao took India into the economic mainstream of the world by initiating economic liberalisation and reversing Nehru's policies in a limited way. And by

allowing *Agni* and other Indian missiles to grow despite the cover of 'technology demonstrator' for *Agni*, the infrastructure of a military missile programme was laid. Here too Nehru deserves credit for allowing India's entry into the civilian application of space science and his successors progressively gave it a military dimension.

In other words, India's sovereignty and capacity to act independently shrank during the Nehru era. It went from a high point to a low point in a number of areas. Nehru had fumbled in many spheres and it was his legacy to his successors. They had to recover from the fumbled game and regain Indian independence and sovereignty in the economic and the military spheres.

NEHRU AND HIS SUCCESSORS CONTRASTED

This section helps us understand Nehru's record and the innovations made by his successors. Four indicators help the discussion.

- (a) Economics—who was more effective in allowing India to join mainstream world capitalism and to promote the material progress of the ruled?
- (b) military strategy—who helped alter the position of India in the distribution of world and regional military power and in the structure of power relationships or alignments?
- (c) diplomatic-cultural strategy—who helped India's prestige as a pole of attraction (or conversely as a pole of revulsion)?
- (d) political ideals and institutions—who helped build the Indian nation?

It will be argued that Nehru was effective initially during the late 1940s and the early 1950s in making India a pole of cultural-diplomatic attraction through his emphasis on peace, diplomacy and non-alignment. He was also effective in projecting India as a fantastic experiment in democracy in Asia.

However, his successors inherited Nehru's strategic problems with China, Pakistan, and the US and it became their responsibility to design an effective military strategy to deal with pressing problems. They engineered innovative shifts from Nehru's limited acceptance of the idea of local defence in Kashmir. These changes first shifted

the Indo-Pakistan military balance and later produced an asymmetry between the two, and semi-equality in the distribution of military power between China and India. The changes were slow and subtle but they were fundamental in nature. Regarding the fourth point, Nehru's approach was undermined by the failure of the Congress Party to maintain its traditional position as the bridge between the Indian state and Indian society. The bridge was Nehru-centric and following his death was hard to sustain. The bridge was personality driven and it lacked an institutional character in the absence of a charismatic political personality at the helm. Moreover, the Congress Party developed a reputation as a broker of powerful forces in Indian society rather than as a defender of the poor and the weak. So the Nehru era and Congress Party politics meant a continuous hijacking of the Indian state apparatus and its resources for the well-being of the powerful and the well connected. The alliance during the Nehru years, which I outlined earlier failed to help in the uplift of the Indian poor. This failure diminished the position of the Congress Party in Indian politics and resulted in the growth of regionalist parties and state administrations, which reflected the aspirations of the people.

Foreign policy is an interaction of political, economic, and cultural forces within a country and diplomatic, economic, and military forces outside a country's border. The evolution of India, during and after the Nehru era, is a dual story—the evolution of the Indian 'nation' as distinct from the Indian 'state' and the evolution of India's place and its policies in the international sphere. The word 'nation' means an idea or a philosophy about a shared past and a shared destiny, which brings people together but it is not simply an idea. Its growth implies moral as well as material progress of the people.¹⁸ In this sense, the 'nation' did not grow during the Nehru regime. The state is easier to define. It is a notional entity, which is symbolised by the existence of a flag, territorial sovereignty, a government apparatus, administrative rules and regulations, and a coercive apparatus in the form of police, military, and intelligence machineries, and yes, there is a hierarchy of civil servants who run the country.

My argument is that Nehru, his family, his inner circle of unelected political advisers such as Menon, Panikkar, and T.N. Kaul, and economic planners, hijacked the Indian state which the British created, and crafted on it the idea of the Indian nation under the ideal of secularism. They sought to develop a link between India's historical past (never specifically defined) and the idea of common development.

Religion and race were rejected as the basis of the Indian nation but in the 1950s language was accepted as a basis of centre–state relations and state politics. For several years the Congress Party served as the link between the Indian state and the Indian nation but this link ultimately failed because the Congress collapsed as a unifying force, and factionalism within the party fragmented its national authority and effectiveness as a grassroots organisation. Nehru's experiment with building the Indian nation 'top down' did not work because it did not meet the basic economic and cultural needs of the people. Consequently a 'bottom up' approach emerged in Indian politics. The state—the Government of India or the political centre, and the state governments—became the political arena where homeland politics and economic and social demands were projected by competing politicised constituencies. The Marathas and the Sikhs of the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries still had local roots and political, economic, and cultural aspirations but new players emerged like the Mizos in the northeast and the RSS in western and northern India.

One should judge Nehru's experiment with Indian nation-building in the context of four 'Indias' in play. None is dominant, they exist in a state of uneasy coexistence, and they form the core of the debate about the 'Indian nation'.

- (a) The first view has been subscribed to by the British. John Strachey said there was no such thing as 'India'. Lord Curzon maintained that no Indian nationality existed on the basis of race, language, religion, that is, bonding elements did not exist. In their view 'India' consisted of village communities and regional empires (Marathas, Sikhs, Mughal, and others) and 'India' was a creation of British rule, which unified the subcontinent through the skilled use of military power and political organisation. It was an administrative contrivance, the reference being to the 1899 British Act of Parliament, which referred to 'India'.
- (b) Nehru's India was a historical idea that cherished a tradition of political and cultural pluralism and synthesis. It was a civilisational idea but Nehru did not acknowledge Hinduism or the Vedas as the core of the 'Indian' past. To him India meant a connection between a philosophy of pluralism and a series of five-year plans, which would secure common development of Indians.

- (c) The third view, expressed by Max Mueller saw India as a civilisational and a historical force with myths and legends. It was a social and a political order based on caste and functions and its cultural appeal extended beyond the subcontinent to Persia, Indonesia, and Greece.
- (d) The fourth view extended the third view to the village communities where the people had a sense of right or wrong and valued a search for the self. The community existed with a sense of territoriality, that is, the village. Here India had a spiritual definition but it lacked territorial unity beyond the village or the city-state or the kingdom.¹⁹

Nehru's sense of importance about Indian culture became the basis of his approach to nation-building as well as his foreign policy. Khilnani outlines Nehru's approach to external affairs: 'A new state like India, weak by international standards, would have to pursue its interests by creating its own opportunities and chances. By speaking the language of morality and justice, it might just be able to surprise and unbalance the more powerful, extracting concessions from their sheer embarrassment.'²⁰

Nehru was rejecting the classical approach to diplomacy and war, that is, classical in ancient Indian terms (Kautilyan) and in the Western realpolitik paradigm, which sets the problem of war and conflict as the central questions of world politics. Instead, Nehru projected the globalist approach as the utopian view that stressed peace and harmony among states and nations. Although Indian foreign affairs converged with Soviet policies in the late 1940s and the early 1950s, this was a matter of practical necessity and it did not represent an embrace of Stalinism. Rather, as Holsti argues, Marxists (not neo-Marxists) are globalists. So were Nehru and Menon who have been described as globalists and theoretical Communists. One must not forget the influence of Marx and Engels in the study of the 'India' question, their influence in shaping the attitudes of the leftists and socialists in the Indian political class during the 1930s and the 1940s, which Nehru represented, and which became a part of his inner circle of policy makers. A point for discussion is whether Marxian globalism or Indian cultural pluralism was the stronger and the more elemental impulse in Nehru's thought process. My preliminary sense is that Nehru was quite ambivalent about the importance of India's cultural past except in the vague sense that there was a tolerance of truth and pluralism in

the history of Indian social and political thought. India's past offered little comfort for Nehruvian pacifism or anti-militarism or anti-war and anti-balance of power position. He took one idea from India's cultural past and attached it to his vision of nation-building by socialist planning and a peaceful foreign policy but the connection was contrived and self-serving. Anti-British imperialism and faith in Soviet socialism and national planning were the more elemental impulses in Nehru's thought processes.²¹

The intellectual link with Marx was not acknowledged because it presumably did not sit well with either Mahatma Gandhi or Patel. So it was practical politics for Nehru to downplay the Marxist heritage as the basis of his globalism and to play up the Indian cultural tradition as the basis of his foreign policy approach. In sum, Nehru's globalism was actually distant from India's old cultural attitude, which required war in the name of truth or for a kingdom's material gain. In effect, Nehru was selective in his choice of the value of pluralism as the basis of Indian secularism and nation-building, and he rejected two other strands from India's cultural past: the importance of just war based on right and wrong, and the importance of a social and political order, which was based on hierarchy (caste, functional divisions, and roles within society). Nehru was acting in a political and an anti-historical way in his selections. They were tied to considerations about his political position in India vis-à-vis his rivals like Patel and the Indian right wing, and his policy needs in relation to his economic planning and his external diplomacy.

Nehru's house of cards functioned well in the absence of a thorough Indian debate about the intellectual or philosophical roots of his attitudes and policies. Much has been written about Nehru's policies but there is nothing that examines the relationship between Marx and Nehruvian globalism (including the advocacy of disarmament by the Indian ministries of External Affairs and Defence) and Indian culture. Nehru was being massaged by his admirers within the Indian government, by a coterie of Indian intellectuals and some foreign ones, by a passive and a trusting public, which was more interested in 'darshan' than an investigation about the soundness of Nehru's thinking and policies, and by an international environment which favoured Nehru's policies during the first half of the 1950s. But when international circumstances began to change with respect to the policies of the Western and the Communist powers, there was no one, certainly not Nehru and his inner circle, who was able to re-examine the relevance of

Nehru's external policies in relation to changing international situation.

The challenge to Nehru's diplomatic and military strategies came from China in the 1962 war. The importance of this event extended beyond the border issue because it brought reform to Nehru's approach to war and peace. It fell to Nehru's successors to make the Sino-Indian conflict, along with the Indo-Pakistan conflict, the central issue in Indian external affairs. Second, the 1962 war evoked a national response that saw a connection between Indian territoriality, the role of military strength and the Indian armed forces, and the relationship between economic and military strength. China's war with India undermined irrevocably Nehru's belief in peace diplomacy. It revealed the insufficiency of Indian democracy as an alternative to China in Asia, the inadequacy of India's cultural past and civilisational base as a barrier to foreign military expansion (as the Chinese learnt at the hands of the British in the Opium War and the Treaty of Nanking, 1842), and the relationship between military strength and territoriality as organising principles of the Indian nation. Nehru's vision of the Indian nation lay in tatters except for the vague idea that the Indian state was an agency to promote the collective good of Indians, rich and poor. But the hijacking of the state apparatus by the powerful sections of Indian society including the ever-growing Indian bureaucracy remained intact; only the cast of character at the top of the policy pyramid changed hands, from Nehru to other members of his family, and later from his family to non-Congress or ex-Congress hands.

The effect of China's militant turn against Nehru and his policies was a turning point in the re-definition of the core principles of the Indian nation and the relationship to the issue of war and India's military machinery. The issue of the territorial unity of India from Kanyakumari to Ladakh acquired a clear public identification after 1962; it became the organising principle of Government of India's defence policies. Nehru viewed the Indian military as mercenary, parasitical, not a part of the growth of Indian national movement against the British rule, and marginal to the promotion of India's public good. Butter was more important than guns was the mantra of the Nehruvians and Indian economists by and large. This was replaced by the notion after 1962 that the armed forces were the guardians of the

state and the nation. Mahatma Gandhi had stimulated Indian nationalism as an idea which rejected foreign rule and the doctrine of racial superiority.

But after 1947, the idea of anti-colonialism was of diminishing value as a cementing element in nation-building. Linguistic and regional differences, along with competing economic and political demands, gained ground after 1947. The internal story was one of growing internal divisions, bickering, and coalition politics, which were of a transient nature because their basis was power sharing and sharing of the spoils rather than principles or convictions. The external story produced different results. Indian border provinces stimulated the growth of a new paradigm. It recognised the link between the importance of defending territory, the central role of the armed forces, defence scientists, and defence industries, economic strength and a new thought process in a new political class, which could protect India and its interests. This required continuous and sound attention to the attitudes and policies of the enemies—public and secret ones—and the skilled use and non-use of force as circumstances required.

The year 1962 was a major catalyst in opening up the internal debate and the Indian thought processes about the relationship between war and peace. Gandhi and Nehru in different ways and under different circumstances believed that if you want peace you must act peacefully. After 1962, Indian public opinion and the Indian government recognised that if you want peace you must prepare for war, the classical view of Western strategic thought. Second, the awareness of territoriality as the core of the Indian nation gained ground; and third, the importance of Indian economic and military modernisation was recognised and the slogan of guns versus butter was replaced by the slogan of guns *and* butter. So the link between the political leadership of the state, the armed forces, the scientists, and the builders of the Indian economy was recognised explicitly. The post-Nehru Indian behaviour, namely, Shastri's decision to cross into Pakistan to relieve the military pressure in Jammu and Kashmir and Indira Gandhi's decision to break up Pakistan in 1971, reflected the new relationships in Indian thinking and the decision-making process. Although stimulated by China, the changed relationships did not mean an acceptance of China's approach. China abandoned its faith in its cultural diplomacy after its defeat in the Opium War and after its experience with civil war in the 1930s and the 1940s. Mao and company saw

value in war and revolution as the basis of its politics. Post-Nehru India on the contrary, saw value in war and war preparations against defined and finite external enemies who challenged Indian territoriality but it also valued political accommodation and pluralism in the domestic and the international sphere.

Up to the mid-1990s the post-Nehru approach, however, was not to systematically engage the international environment by coercive means with a view to secure negotiated restraint by India's opponents. Nehru had relied on a policy of unilateral restraint in the nuclear sphere, thinking that it gave India the high moral ground and that this would win him points in the world community and with India's opponents—Pakistan, China, and America (the latter during the Cold War). He was mistaken in this belief. Restraint is recognised by great powers when the other side is seen to possess a military capacity to inflict harm to its interests. This is measured by an ability to initiate, manage, and to terminate a war or conflict at will. This is defined as the power to escalate an international or a regional conflict by choice. Shastri and Indira Gandhi demonstrated this power in the 1965 and the 1971 wars respectively, and A.B. Vajpayee demonstrated it through the Pokhran-II tests and the declaration that India was a nuclear weapon state. To engage means to develop a capability and a strategy to target the opposition, to execute the action at some risk to the doer, to show a willingness to accept consequences or costs, and to survive the costs and then to live to negotiate restraints.

Up to the mid-1990s, Nehru's successors made significant changes in his approach to nation-building, his economic, and military policies, but the changes were mostly ad hoc—they lacked staying power or long-term effectiveness. The military-diplomatic policies were vulnerable to international pressure and veto. Moreover, some actions were reversible. For example, Shastri's decision to cross the international border into Pakistan and make a link between the 'disputed' Kashmir region and the Indo-Pakistan border was followed by international (American-Soviet-Chinese) pressure for a ceasefire and, consequently, Soviet mediation. Shastri could not hold out against external pressures but this was a learning experience for Indira Gandhi. The 1971 military campaign was planned to avoid a diplomatic and a military stalemate. The 1971 war showed Indian staying power. But then Indira Gandhi exploded the bomb in 1974, and quickly under

American pressure reversed course, calling it a peaceful explosion and denying military intent. So Indira Gandhi was neither engaging the world's powers through disarmament diplomacy—none of them were willing to reduce their weaponry and to adjust the distribution of power—nor was she engaging them as nuclear powers—which would require India to develop its nuclear weapons status. Either way India was not a factor in the nuclear question and in the international decision making about it.

Indira Gandhi's economic policies retained the Nehruvian mixed economy paradigm, and its socialist/populist image was enhanced by the removal of privy purses from Indian princes and the nationalisation of banks. But the common development of Indians remained an elusive goal. Nor was India joining the mainstream of world capitalism, a process initiated later by the minority government of Narasimha Rao. Rao's decision to liberalise the economy in a limited way came a decade after China embraced economic reforms but nevertheless it was a move in the right direction. However, it was vulnerable to internal vetoes—from Indian leftists and trade unions who benefited from the inefficient state enterprises which offered employment rather than improved productivity for Indians; hence the changes were circumscribed by internal political and social forces. But Rao's nation-building was limited to the economic sphere and in the strategic sphere the leap into short and long-range missiles for Indian defence was hemmed in by American pressures.

Up until the mid-1990s, China built up its nuclear and missile capacity to contain India directly and since the early 1960s built up military and diplomatic links with Pakistan to contain India indirectly. From the early 1980s onwards China increased its pressure on India by establishing its commercial and military presence in Myanmar and in the Bay of Bengal region. The Government of India failed to create a clear public identification against China as a strategic and a diplomatic rival of India in Asia and in the world. By treating the Himalayan problem as a border issue, which was mired in legal agreements, historical 'facts', and 'Chinese aggressiveness' that could be dealt with by patient diplomacy by the Ministry of External Affairs, Indian territorial nationalism remained preoccupied with the Kashmir issue rather than the Sino-Pakistan alliance, which was working to check Indian influences in the entire Himalayan region—from Kashmir to

the northeast, in India's eastern flank (Myanmar), and in the Indian Ocean/Bay of Bengal area, and to contain and Balkanise it, if possible. One must, therefore, wonder why controversies with Pakistan and the US have been overplayed in Indian pronouncements and actions and why they have been downplayed in relation to China. Based on the evidence available since the early 1960s, the emphasis ought to have been on the China–Pakistan alignment and its military and diplomatic content and on China's presence in other parts of India's strategic neighbourhood.

Nehru tried to link India's cultural past and future destiny inside India and in the international sphere by projecting the Congress Party as a secular enterprise that could protect and accommodate the minorities. This paradigm worked as long as the Congress Party was a meaningful arena to accommodate competing political, economic, and social forces in India. It also worked as long as the international military environment was secure, that is, as long as the global balance of power protected India from military attack and containment. However, it failed in both ways when the Congress Party lost its internal legitimacy and sense of democracy under Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi. Neither allowed internal elections and the Congress Party system became centralised, highly personality oriented, intellectually and materially corrupt, and without internal checks and balances. China's military attack also invalidated Nehru's optimistic view that no one dared to attack India.

Nehru also misread the strategic basis of American policy towards India as well as the strategic basis of Lord Mountbatten's advice to him on the Kashmir and the Pakistani issues. America, like Communist China, took a strategic view of its interests in relation to Kashmir, Pakistan, and India. This trend was obvious even in the Security Council debate in the late 1940s where the US government viewed India's reference of the Kashmir dispute to the UN in terms of the Cold War and in terms of its interests in Pakistan. In the 1970s, America showed the vitality of the realpolitik tradition and the importance it attached to China because it, and not India, was an important global power along with Soviet Russia and America. So American actions maintained the primacy of Indo-Pakistan bipolarity until the late 1990s. The US recognised China as a major Asian power with legitimate interests in the subcontinent—this was the base of the Clinton administration's policy on China and India, particularly during Clinton's first term in office. This stance was antithetical to Indian interests. It revealed

that the American democracy was functioning as India's secret enemy at the time. Indian history tells us that India is open to manipulation by foreign influences and that the Indian democracy permits and facilitates such external manipulation. Without internal discipline as in China, the Indian polity is more like a noisy band with a changing cast of conductors (prime ministers who come and go and who occasionally can bring the band to order), and so Indian nationalism continues to be in an ad hoc crisis or war driven sentiment without much staying power.

So the Indian scorecard reads somewhat as follows:

- (a) British rule unified India as a territorial unit and the process took shape over 300 years till the Partition broke the unity of the subcontinent but still left behind a territorially cohesive India.
- (b) Unlike China where the Han race and single party communist rule is the basis of the Chinese nation, neither race nor religion or language defines the Indian nation. Indeed, they are divisive elements.
- (c) After an unprecedented opportunity to rule India for almost 50 years, the Congress Party failed to create an Indian nation along Nehruvian lines. What the Nehru family was able to do was to strengthen their hold over the Indian state and to strengthen the administrative capabilities of the state and its ability to mobilise the resources of the country under the direction of a stronger state apparatus.
- (d) The Nehru paradigm created the expectation that India's culture and its past could be linked to the dream of common development for the well-being of the ruled but did not connect India either to the global economic or strategic mainstream. It kept India on the margins of world power although its strategic location and cultural background would have justified its participation in the main-stream in both areas. The marginalisation of India in the economic and strategic spheres since India gained independence was the result of made-in-India problems and policies.
- (e) The first step to join the international economic mainstream was taken by a minority government under Narasimha Rao. And then another minority government led by A.B. Vajpayee took the major step to join the strategic mainstream by going

nuclear openly and irreversibly, by shedding the Nehruvian policy of unilateral self-restraint, by forcing back Pakistani forces in Kargil, by bringing out the Sino-Indian competition into the open and by securing a positive Indo-US strategic relationship that was positioned in the context of the future of the balance of power and multipolarity in Asia especially in the critical zone between the Indian subcontinent and the South China Sea, and between China and India in the Himalayas.

THE RISING SUN IN POST-NEHRUVIAN INDIA

The post-Nehru India shows the durability of trend of coalition governments at the centre because no single party has been voted into Parliament with a majority by the Indian people. The identity of the Indian people is linked to villages and regions, and regional governments are closest to the people in the absence of national parties. Now 'Indian nation-building' is not based on the cultural past because it does not provide Indians with a shared collective memory, and factors like religion, language, caste, and economic differences are divisive. Still unifying elements exist. They lie in four relationships:

- (a) between the importance of territorial unity and its defence by the armed forces rather than by the Indian political and the administrative class;
- (b) between material gain of the classes and castes and economic reforms;
- (c) between the utilisation of Indian science and technology and the country's industrial and military development; and
- (d) finally, between the development of a new ruling class that can mobilise a politicised Hinduism with strengthened process of economic reforms and an activist military and commercial diplomacy that extends into India's strategic neighbourhood.

Vajpayee is described here as a representative of India, the rising sun. As the head of a minority government he had completed five

years in office despite predictions of an early demise. I am using the term 'sun' to make two comparisons. The first is in terms of the influence of India in world politics under Nehru and Vajpayee. India went from a position of high influence (1947–mid-1950s) to acquiring a marginal status in world politics under Nehru. The position of India in world politics under Vajpayee, on the other hand, went from a marginal to a mainstream one in international strategic and economic affairs (1998–to the present). This comparison is measurable objectively by assessing India's position and ranking in the distribution of world power in the two eras. And it is measurable subjectively in terms of the recognition of India's importance (or the lack of it during the Nehru years). The second comparison between the two leaders is in terms of the philosophy (the core ideas), the approach, and the methods involved in the exercise of power. Nehru took a global, socialist, anti-military and anti-imperialist view and in hindsight he served Indian interests badly. Vajpayee had a pragmatic approach to the economic and social development of India, he used a judicious combination of coercion and negotiation to promote Indian interests and to re-engage other powers in the strategic and economic spheres.

I have personalised the story because Indian decision-making is highly personalised. The Nehruvian economic and strategic paradigm has been significantly altered in a short time span and under difficult domestic and external circumstances, and Vajpayee had demonstrated the capacity to build and to maintain domestic as well as external coalitions with traditional and non-traditional allies. His policies may be described as 'nationalist' to the extent that they were informed by a general consensus, but they are not fundamentalist in the sense that his views are not a replica of the views held by the Rashtriya Swayam-sevak Sangh (RSS) or even his own party. His policies especially in relation to Pakistan have shown a search for a negotiated settlement as in the case of the Lahore and Agra diplomatic ventures.

Vajpayee symbolised three trends in Indian nation-building and in contemporary Indian foreign affairs. The first trend is to mobilise political Hinduism along with the traditional emphasis on the value of political pluralism. Both values have shaped the approach of the ruling BJP-led coalition government, which has been in power for five years. This coalition has created space for politicalised Hinduism as well as for regional statism, and yet Hinduism, the faith of the majority has been rejected as the dominant basis of the state; the

distinction between state and religion has been maintained. Vajpayee and his colleagues see Hinduism as a historical and a spiritual force, but not as the basis of Indian state and society. Here the centre of gravity of Indian politics has changed in the following way: politicised Hinduism now is a part of the Indian political centre, and it has shifted from a position of irrelevance or the marginal status it had during the Nehru years to a prominent place in Indian coalition politics and in the political spectrum of pluralism in India.

The second trend rejects the pacifist and the globalist Nehruvian approach, which was at odds with the Kautilyan tradition in Indian history and the realpolitik tradition in Western international history and practice over the last 500 years. Vajpayee's approach was to shift Indian external policies into an expansionist (non-territorial), outward looking, and international position where expansionism or projection of Indian influence into its strategic neighbourhood is taken to be a normal activity of the Indian state. This requires an interface between military, commercial, and political diplomacy rather than the Nehruvian approach, which emphasised talks minus the muscles. Vajpayee's approach requires Indian interaction with traditional allies (France and Russia) as well as non-traditional allies (the US and Japan) along with Kuwait and Singapore and other actors in India's strategic neighbourhood.

Nehru's faith in utopian ideas stands rejected and the emphasis today is on building new and durable relationships, which are based on concrete and common interests. Vajpayee drained Nehru's moralism and pacifism out of India's external policies. Vajpayee's stand on Pakistan is also very different from Nehru's views. Nehru was obsessed with Pakistan as the main threat to India but also believed that friendship with Pakistan was possible. Nehru also believed that friendship with China was possible. Today, this also stands rejected and has been replaced with the idea that China and India are strategic rivals and that this rivalry should be dealt with realistically. Vajpayee believes that this rivalry can help bring out the best in the country's technological, economic, and military preparations and policies. Vajpayee's political and diplomatic manoeuvrings in regional and world affairs revealed an affinity with Kautilyan stratagems. The comparison now is between Vajpayee's policies and the Indian philosophy of success as outlined by Zimmer. Vajpayee is a poet by temperament, not an international theoretician, but his actions correspond neatly with the

Western realpolitik tradition, which is the dominant tradition in modern international relations.

The third trend relates to a quest for economic reforms but here Vajpayee's progress has been slow because of two challenges: one, the Nehruvian legacy and the faith of Indian leftists and trade unionists in Indian socialism and two, the RSS's apprehensions about Westernisation and modernisation. The two forces impede Indian economic reforms even though their respective reasons for opposing reforms differ. The internal debate about the scope and pace of economic reforms and privatisation shows the gap between Vajpayee's economic philosophy, which favours faster and far-reaching reforms, and that of the Hindu fundamentalists who believe in self-reliance and crave the simplicity of traditional Indian life.

NOTES

1. K.J. Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory* (London: Unwin Hyman, Inc., 1985), p. 8.
2. Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 186.
3. Heinrich R. Zimmer and J. Campbell, *Philosophies of India* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), p. 139.
4. Robert Marks, *The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Ecological Narrative* (Boston: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002), p. 63.
5. K.M. Panikkar, *Asia and Western Dominance: A Survey of the Vasco da Gama Epoch of Asian History, 1498-1945* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1959).
6. Arthur Lall, *The Emergence of Modern India* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1981).
7. Alastair Buchan, *The End of the Postwar Era: A New Balance of World Power* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974), p. 294.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 284.
9. Escott Reid, *Envoy to Nehru* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 219.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 190.
11. Sunil Khilnani, *The Idea of India* (New Delhi: Penguin, 1997), pp. 86-89.
12. *Ibid.* The author thanks Professor Baldev Nayar and Balbir Sahni for their comments on the planning process.
13. Geoffrey Fairbairn, *Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare* (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1974).
14. Indeed, it was an Afro-Asian Conference and the first Non-Aligned Conference was still six years away.
15. Sunil Khilnani, *The Idea of India*, p. 39.
16. Owen Lattimore, *Solution in Asia* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1945).

- 17 Sunil Khilnani, *The Idea of India*, pp. 1–11.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 68.
19. For John Strachey and Lord Curzon's views see Sunil Khilnani, *The Idea of India*, pp. 154–55. For Mueller's views, see F. Max Mueller, *India: What Can it Teach Us?* (New Delhi: Rupa, 2002), pp. 35–43, 48–56 and 69.
20. Sunil Khilnani, *The Idea of India*, p. 178.
21. K.J. Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline*, p. 61. Marx and Engels wrote extensively on the 'India question'; see *On Colonialism* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1959 and 1968). For Nehru's embrace of socialism (not Stalinist totalitarianism) and the central place of the international left in Nehru's foreign policies, see V.K. Madhavan Kutty, *V.K. Krishna Menon* (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1988), Chapter XI. According to S. Gopal, 'what Jawaharlal [Nehru] hoped to do was to lead his party and the Indian middle class generally to socialism without their knowing it.' See S. Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. 1, 1889–1947* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), Chapter 15, especially pp. 232–38 and 245–48 for Nehru's fascination with leftist internationalism and Indian socialism through national planning on the Soviet economic model.